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Abstract
Various epidemics have arisen in rural locations through human-animal interaction, such as the H1N1 outbreak of 2009.
Through collaboration with local government officials, we have surveyed a rural county and its communities and collected a
dataset characterizing the rural population. From the respondents’ answers, we build a social (face-to-face) contact network.
With this network, we explore the potential spread of epidemics through a Susceptible-Latent-Infected-Recovered (SLIR)
disease model. We simulate an exact model of a stochastic SLIR Poisson process with disease parameters representing a
typical influenza-like illness. We test vaccine distribution strategies under limited resources. We examine global and
location-based distribution strategies, as a way to reach critical individuals in the rural setting. We demonstrate that
locations can be identified through contact metrics for use in vaccination strategies to control contagious diseases.
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Introduction
In general, the spread of infectious diseases can be contained by
human response using different approaches. Susceptible people
can acquire immunization through vaccination, or can protect
themselves from the diseases using preventive behaviors, such as
avoiding close physical contacts with infected individuals or using
hygienic habits. Correspondingly, human responses can be
modeled using three classes of models distinguished by changes
taking place in compartments, parameters, or contact levels to take
into account the behavioral changes [1].
A vast literature exists on efficient vaccination strategies, given
the need for efficient strategies to distribute vaccines that can often
be insufficient for the entire population. Some of these strategies
assume that human contact networks are well represented by scale
free networks. One popular strategy aims at immunizing those
individuals having the highest number of contacts, as the most
critical actors for spreading the infection [2]. However, local
strategies are more efficient and implementable and often require
a lower fraction of the population to be vaccinated than random
global immunization to contain epidemics. The strategy of
acquaintance immunization proposes the immunization of ran-
dom acquaintances of random individuals [3]. Another local
strategy proposes to vaccinate highly connected acquaintances of
randomly selected people; based on the properties of scale free
networks, with this approach the probability of targeting the highly
connected individuals in the contact network increases with
respect to the simple random selection [4]. In the case of a limited
amount of available vaccines, the authors of [5] use stochastic
simulations of epidemic and numerical optimization methods to
find near-optimal vaccine distributions to minimize the epidemic
size. Again in the case of a limited amount of available vaccines,
the best strategy suggests to vaccinate schoolchildren, the
population group with highest contact in different communities,
and the high-risk groups, the population groups that need
protection [6]. Since a strong community structure can be
detected in social contact networks, the approach in [7] aims at
immunizing individuals bridging communities rather than simply
targeting highly connected individuals. An extensive set of
simulations performed in [8] suggests two strategies based on
age classes: In the first strategy vaccinating older children,
adolescents, and young adults minimizes the number of infections,
while in the second strategy vaccinating either younger children
and older adults or young adults minimizes the number of deaths.
Using game theory, the authors of [9] show that when vaccination
is an individual’s choice, a periodic behavior can be seen in
simulations. A severe epidemic in one year incentivizes high
vaccination rates in the following year, causing a milder epidemic
for which individuals have less motivation for vaccination in the
subsequent year. In [10], authors develop a vaccination strategy
based on optimizing the susceptible size by a partitioning of the
contact network through vaccination. Based on the authors’
simulations, this strategy is more efficient than those based on
vaccinating the highest betweenness or contact individuals. Using
a decision-making framework for vaccine distribution policies
based on a geographical and demographical data in USA, the
authors of [11] find that distributing vaccines first to counties
where the latest epidemic waves are expected is the most efficient
policy.
In any case, assessing the effectiveness of mitigation strategies
and behavioral responses both from a public health point of view
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and from individuals’ perspectives is a complex and not fully-
explored problem. In particular, a thorough evaluation and
comparison of feasible mitigation strategies in the specific setting of
rural regions is missing. In other words, not only the amount of
success a given strategy can provide is not determined, but also its
related cost in economical and social terms is unknown.
In this paper, we carry out extensive simulations on a weighted
contact network determined by collected data in the City of
Chanute and Neosho County in the State of Kansas. In particular
we study the impact of limited resource vaccination campaigns,
using an exact model of a stochastic SLIR Poisson process.
Simulations are run across several scenarios and with stochastic
sets of the SLIR model parameters. The evaluation of the
vaccination campaigns is performed computing the average
number of cases prevented per a single vaccine and the sizes
and durations of the outbreaks. Our contributions are twofold: we
construct and analyze a data-based rural contact network and we
provide a thorough analysis and comparison of mitigation
strategies in a rural region. We hope that our results can provide
practical guidelines for health officials to contain and suppress
epidemics in rural regions.
Methods
In the following we describe the data collection and analysis,
and the models for the network, for the epidemic spreading, and
also for vaccination strategies and distributions.
1. Data Collection and Analysis
As of the 2010 U.S. Census, Neosho County was a rural county
with 16,512 residents in 571.5 square miles in southeastern
Kansas. Most of the population was White (94.1%); a majority
were female (50.6%) and many (17.4%) were 65 years of age or
older. The median household income was $36,702 with 17.0%
living below the poverty level. Between July and October 2010, the
towns of Chanute, Thayer, and Galesburg were selected to
participate in a survey concerning factors that would predict the
spread of epidemics in rural areas. From county public household
rosters, households were randomly selected from Chanute (10%,
N=171), Thayer (50%, N=158), and Galesburg (50%, N=73)
for a total initial N=402. After considerations mentioned in the
supplementary information, the final number of available and
eligible households were 143, 65, and 162 in Thayer, Galesburg,
and Chanute, respectively, with total N=370.
The tailored design method was used, with minor modifications,
to improve response rates [12–15] with a focus on personalization
and multiple follow-up mailings. The initial survey also included a
local news report announcing the impending start of the survey
[16]. Overall, 242 surveys were for an overall response rate of
65.4%. The response rate for Chanute was 74.7% (121/162). The
response rate for Thayer and Galesburg combined was 55.8%
(116/208). The difference in response rates (74.7% vs. 55.8%)
between Chanute and Thayer/Galesburg was significant statisti-
cally, two-sided Fisher’s Exact Test (p,.001), odds ratio = 2.34
(95% CI, 1.50–3.66, p,.001). The difference in response rate for
the more urban location was probably related to the content of the
survey, which focused on respondents’ visiting locations of stores,
public sites, and restaurants in Chanute itself. Thus, the survey
probably seemed more relevant to Chanute residents, even though
we were interested in how often households from outlying towns
went to the nearest urban center to visit or shop.
A majority (56%) of the respondents reported being from
Chanute compared to 23% from Thayer and 10% from Galesburg
(the remaining percentage did not specify exactly where they were
from). Of the 357 participants, the largest number were ages 45 to
64 (47.1%), with 26.1% 65 years of age or older and 18.8% (26–
44) and 8.1% (18 to 25) younger than 45. A majority of the
participants were females (57.6%). Most of the respondents
(75.4%) had lived in their local community for 15 years or more.
The vast majority (97.5%) of the respondents lived in a single
family home. Very few (6.2%) of the households included a
homebound member. Most of the respondents had either the
equivalent of a high school degree (22%) or a college (23%) or
graduate (12%) degree. Nearly sixty percent had incomes between
$25,000 and 100,000 a year with 11% earning more and 30%
earning less. Some respondents had type I (1.2%) or type II
diabetes (10.4%) or were pre-diabetic (3.2%). Most respondents
considered themselves to be slightly (35.7%), somewhat (18.2%), or
extremely (8.6%) overweight. Most (56.6%) reported that they ate
out one or two times a week with 26% eating out more often and
17% not at all.
In terms of compliance risk, nearly 49% of respondents said
they would still visit at least one or two households outside of their
home if there was a serious epidemic and radio/TV/internet had
told them to remain at home and not visit with others. Figure 1
presents the distribution of the number of individuals that a
respondent expects to still visit against advice. Only half (50.0%) of
the respondents had been vaccinated against the flu within the past
six months. Nearly 40 percent (38.9%) did not obtain such a
vaccination because of concerns about the vaccine’s safety or
effectiveness. Only about 7% believed they had come down with
the flu within the past six months while about 18% thought they
might have come down with a cold. About 18% of the respondents
reported taking vitamin D supplements; only 6% reported taking
zinc supplements. Approximately 80% of the respondents had
extensive contact with domestic pets on a daily basis while about
19% of respondents had contact with farm animals or wild animals
regularly, shown in figure 2. Contact risk (low, moderate, high)
was significantly related statistically with compliance risk (none,
low, high) (p,.001, ES= 0.50, medium effect size). As contact risk
increased from low to high, high compliance risk increased from
4.4% to 21.8%; as contact risk decreased from high to low, the
percentage of respondents with no compliance risk increased from
38.6% to 62.3%.
Figure 1. Distribution of discouraged household visits. The
distribution of the number of households that a respondent expects to
still visit in a week against advice during a serious epidemic is shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059028.g001
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2. Models
Here, the procedure to construct the contact network from
survey data is explained. Furthermore, the compartmental model
used for simulations and the preemptive vaccination strategies are
described.
From the survey responses, we constructed a rural contact
network as an estimation of the social contact structure among the
survey respondents. The network is based on two central
questions: the number of contacts that a person has, and the
locations that a person visits at different times in a typical day. The
basis for the interactions between a pair of respondents is the
locations that they both visited in common. We considered 4 types
of location-based interactions: both visit the same location in the
morning, both visit the same location in the afternoon, both visit
the same location in the evening, and both visit the same location
regardless of time. The fourth category introduces some overlap-
ping in the interactions, but it is added to account for some of the
uncertainty in potential pathways of the disease spread. We
considered 66 locations in the network construction and therefore
264= 6664 possible interactions between each pair of survey
respondents. We compute normalized weights from each respon-
dent i to each other respondent j given by lij, representing the
number of location-based interactions between respondents i and j.
For the few respondents who did not complete the section of the
survey regarding location visits, we assign them uniform weights of
interacting with every other respondent in the network. Letting
nodes represent the set of N=353 respondents and weighted links
represent the contact between them; we have a symmetric contact
network at this point. Next we uniformly scale the weights on the
links directed outward from each respondent i such that the sum of
these weights is equal to the number of contacts that respondent i
has indicated having with his or her response (wij= ai*lij for every j
in 1, 2, … N). (This scaling makes irrelevant the absolute value of
the uniform weight of the respondents who lack location data.)
The bipartite network of locations and survey respondents is
finally represented as a weighted, directed (asymmetrical), and
unipartite contact network of 353 nodes, with each pair of nodes (i
and j) connected by two links which are respectively characterized
by the weights wij and wji.
Six of the vaccination strategies will center on three node
metrics: incoming node strength (the sum of the weights incoming
to a node), outgoing node strength (the sum of the weights
outgoing from a node), and node betweenness (a count of the
shortest paths among all pairs that utilize the node) [17,18]. The
incoming node strength of a node is a topology metric that
captures the direct impact of the network on the node. The
outgoing node strength captures the direct impact that a node can
have on the network. The betweenness of a node is a measure
which captures the significance of a node in traversing the
network. A node with a higher betweenness would be more likely
to be traversed (in a shortest-path-type travel across the network
between any pair of nodes) than a node with lower betweenness.
Although an epidemic is not restricted to following the shortest
paths across a network, the betweenness metric still plays an
important role in identifying nodes which are likely to catch the
disease if it reaches a majority of the nodes in the network. The
rural contact network is depicted in figure 3, where the nodes
representing individuals are shown in purple in a cloud and they
are connected to the locations that they frequent, shown as orange
nodes on the map [19].
On this weighted network, we model an epidemic outbreak
using a Susceptible-Latent-Infected-Recovered compartmental
model (SLIR) [17,20]. In the SLIR model, we assume infections
arrive at a susceptible (S) node j from an infected (I) node i with a
rate that is a product of the directed contact wij and the basic
infection rate b. When an infection arrives to a susceptible node,
the node takes on a latent infection (transfers from the susceptible
compartment to the latent compartment). A node, once latent (L),
is considered unable to spread the disease, but is developing to that
stage with rate l. The inverse of the rate l is the expected time for
a node to spend in the latent state. The next stage of the disease,
the infected/infectious state, enables the node to spread infections
to each of its neighbors at rates proportional to the weights on its
outgoing links. Each infected node recovers from the infected state
at a rate m. Once a node is in the recovered state (R), it remains
recovered and does not participate in the disease process any
further.
We simulate this model exactly using an event-driven simulation
of the SLIR process on the weighted rural contact network. We
initialize the simulation by assigning a disease state to each node
and then drawing exponential waiting times for the next event at
each node. Taking the event with the minimum time across all
nodes, we advance the event node to its next disease state and re-
draw waiting times for all nodes. This step is repeated until all
waiting times are infinite, which happens when the disease process
is complete. At this point, all nodes will be either susceptible or
recovered. In the event-driven simulation, the time periods
between successive events will not be regular, but instead they
are non-integer stochastic values.
Vaccination is carried out by selecting a set of nodes and
immunizing them with a certain vaccine efficacy rate. We consider
seven different strategies for selecting the set of nodes for
vaccination. The first and simplest strategy is a random selection
of 10% of the population (35 nodes). The random method
represents a blind distribution across the population. The next
three strategies consider a targeted selection of nodes (individuals)
based respectively on the three node metrics, incoming node
strength, outgoing node strength, and node betweenness. These
three strategies are idealistically implemented by selecting the 35
nodes with the highest values for the respective metric and
administering the vaccine. For less ideal situations, we consider
three additional strategies that attempt to represent feasible
vaccine distribution strategies for rural populations. Considering
again the three above mentioned network metrics, we determine
the location which has the highest average value (on the set of
nodes that visit the location) of each metric. These locations are a
restaurant (outgoing node strength), a pharmacy (node between-
Figure 2. Distribution of human-animal interactions. The
distribution of types of animals a respondent interacts with in a typical
day is shown. Note that the total does not sum to one as respondents
can interact with multiple types of animals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059028.g002
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ness), and a location used for public events (incoming node
strength). After selecting the locations that represent on average
the best places to find nodes with higher values of each metric, we
consider a random selection within a location of 10% of the entire
population for vaccination. This location-based targeting has been
proposed in [20]. It allows an indirect (and thus more feasible)
targeting of critical populations that ensures a more effective use of
resources than widely distributing resources in a global manner.
Note that there is an implicit assumption that the entire population
is susceptible previous to the distribution of the vaccine. Although
this is not a realistic assumption for a commonly occurring strain
of influenza, it would likely be the case for any new disease threat.
In figure 4, a simple exemplification of these strategies is described.
Results
We measured on the network the metrics of interest for the
vaccination targeting strategies. Figure 5 shows the diversity found
in the weights that measure the levels of contact between each
neighboring pair of nodes. Roughly 30 percent of the links carry
very small weights, and there are very few links representing the
highest weighted contacts. In figure 6 we display two views of the
network topology to visualize the estimated rural community
contact structure. Since the network is rather dense, we remove
the links with lower weights in two different patterns. On the left
side of figure 6, we colored the nodes and the links having weights
between 0.2 and 1.0, where the weights of the green links are
between 0.2 and 0.3 and those of the purple links are between 0.3
and 1.0. In this depiction, a minority but significant set of
individuals (roughly 50 nodes) can been noticed for their state of
isolation. These nodes are not strongly connected to the core of the
network, but are connected when the links with the lowest weights
are considered. This loosely connected ‘‘fringe’’ of the rural
community is rarely reached by epidemics until a very strong
epidemic comes. On the right side of figure 6, we colored the
nodes and the links having weights between 0.4 and 1.0 as well as
what we call the ‘‘best-friends’’ links. For each node, we select the
link having the highest out-going weight and define this link as the
‘‘best-friend’’ link of the node. This depiction of the network
captures the most likely paths (it is composed of the highest
weighted links) that an epidemic might take from anywhere in the
network towards the center of the network. Although this pattern
of visualization may give the false impression that the network is
tree-like or scale-free, an epidemic would leave a tree-like pattern
as it traces its way through the rural community. Note that figure 5
proves that both of these network visualizations in figure 6 are
missing majorities of the links in the complete network.
Figure 7 shows the distribution of the node betweenness metric
for the network. More than 80 percent of the nodes have very
small values of node betweenness, leaving a select group of nodes
that are critical connections in the system of shortest paths through
the community.
Figure 8 depicts the distribution of the node in-strength metric
for the network. It is much less heterogeneous than the node
betweenness and link weight distributions as the in-strengths are
found rather homogeneous across the nodes. We explored the
Figure 3. Survey-based rural contact network of Neosho County. A depiction of the rural contact network developed from a survey of
Neosho County is shown, where the individuals are represented by purple nodes in a ‘‘cloud,’’ which is connected by the respondents local travel
habits to the set of rural locations shown in orange on the map.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059028.g003
Figure 4. Example of vaccination strategies for individuals (purple nodes) in a contact network. Orange nodes represent locations, red
circles represent the selected nodes for vaccination, and the green nodes represent random selected individuals, whose friends will be candidate for
vaccination.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059028.g004
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correlations between the network metrics and various survey
responses and found that node betweenness was significantly
correlated with age (r=2.15, p,.01), travel time to work (r= .20,
p,.001), distance to work (r= .19, p,.001), level of education
(r= .12, p,.05), number of non-family friends contacted weekly
(r= .51, p,.05), and hours away from home each day (r= .22,
p,.001). The outgoing node strength was significantly correlated
with age (r=2.20, p,.001), visiting with more family members
outside one’s residence (r= .18, p,.01), household size (r= .12,
p,.05), travel time to work (r= .44, p,.001), distance to work
(r= .45, p,.001), compliance risk (r= .13, p,.05), level of
education (r= .23, p,.001), income (r= .17, p,.01), having
Figure 5. Distribution of the weights representing social contact for the rural community contact network. Note that the vertical axis
has a log scale.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059028.g005
Figure 6. Two visualizations of the rural contact structure within the network. (Left) A visualization of the rural community contact network
showing the nodes and the links having weights between 0.2 and 1.0, where the weights of the green links are between 0.2 and 0.3 and those of the
purple links are between 0.3 and 1.0. (Right) A visualization of the rural community contact network showing the nodes and the links having weights
between 0.4 and 1.0 as well as the ‘‘best-friends’’ links, where the best friend link of a node is defined as the link having the highest out-going weight.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059028.g006
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diabetes ( r=2.12, p,.05), how often one eats out (r= .16, p,.01),
and hours away from home each day (r= .50, p,.001). Node in-
strength was correlated with level of education (r = .12, p,.05) and
having had the flu in the past six months (r =2.12, p,.05).
In general, while many of these relationships are not especially
strong in terms of effect sizes, it appears that residents with higher
levels of education, who have longer commutes, who are younger,
with more income, those without diabetes or recent flu-like
illnesses, who are away from home more hours each day, and who
eat out more often are more likely to be important agents in the
network measures that influence the potential spread of epidemics.
It is interesting to observe that the younger rural residents are
Figure 7. Distribution of the node betweenness values of the individuals in the rural community contact network. Note that the
vertical axis has a log scale.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059028.g007
Figure 8. Distribution of the node in-strength values of the individuals in the rural community contact network. Note that the vertical
axis has a log scale.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059028.g008
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likely the most important agents when considering that rural
regions are typically characterized by aging populations. This
importance appears to be due to them, the younger persons,
spending more time away from home, driving longer to work,
visiting more businesses, and in all this, having and visiting more
persons outside of their homes. Perhaps, the traditional farmer
who rarely visits town and is mostly self-sufficient within his home
and immediate neighbors is giving way to a younger generation
and changing economy where increased travel and social
interaction are increasingly required.
We performed extensive simulations to investigate potential
epidemics and the proposed vaccination strategies for the rural
contact network representing a sample population from Neosho
County. To mimic a realistic epidemic with the stochastic SLIR
model, we utilize average values of l21 = 0.764 days, m21 = 1.736
days, and R0=b/m=1.75 with respective standard deviations of
0.100 days, 0.100 days, and 0.065 [21–27]. We explore the
hypothetical outbreaks first by simulating 1,000,000 trials of the
considered situation (such as without mitigation or with a specific
mitigation strategy). For each trial, a triple of (l, m, R0) is drawn
from the three Gaussian distributions with the respective
parameters and the outbreak is simulated until it dies out, leaving
only susceptible and recovered individuals behind. This first type
of experiment attempts to capture the diversity of possible
influenza-like outbreaks in the rural community and we use the
results of these for numerical comparisons between the different
mitigation strategies. However, the irregularity of the parameter
values does not yield insightful figures. The second type of
experiment we ran was the simulation of sets of 10,000 trials that
scan over values R0 to quantify the range of potential outbreaks. In
this second type of experiment, we deterministically vary R0, while
l and m are still drawn from their distributions [28,29].
For each simulation, we track the numbers of nodes in each
disease state through time as well as the timings of all event
occurrences. We capture the total cases, representing this as the
attack rate or the fraction of the total population infected, and the
duration of each outbreak in days. The duration of an outbreak is
the (continuous) time in days from the beginning of the simulation
to the recovery (I to R transition) of the last infected node at which
point all nodes in the network will either be susceptible or
recovered. We define an outbreak as any trial that resulted in at
least one secondary infection and present statistics only over the
trials successfully demonstrating outbreaks. We simplify the
presentation of the results of the second type of experiment by
computing and plotting the average and 95% range of the
resulting total cases for each group of 10,000 simulations on a
single R0 [21–23,25–27]. Figure 9 summarizes the distributions of
the total cases as a fraction of the population infected (attack rate)
in the manner described above. As R0 increases, the epidemic size
increases in a near-linear manner. It can be seen that distributions
are broad but have low average values. This figure suggests that
around 5 percent of the population might on average fall sick
during an influenza season, but a few large outbreaks might touch
30–40 percent of the community. It is interesting to observe in
figure 9 that the average attack rate varies little over the explored
range and the median attack rate varies even less. The regularity of
the outbreak distributions for different epidemic strengths is likely
due to the strongly connected core of the network and the weakly
connected fringes.
We ran seven sets of simulations to consider the seven
vaccination strategies described in Section 3 and for each set we
ran both types of experiments as described previously. In each
trial, we draw a value for vaccine efficacy from a Gaussian
distribution with mean of 72.0% and standard deviation of 6.0%
to approximate realistic efficacy values [30–32]. The first
vaccination strategy, the random distribution over the entire
population, is the selection of a group of individuals representing
10 percent of the population and administering vaccines prior to
the start of an outbreak with the given efficacy. Figure 10
demonstrates the potential reduction in the distributions of
outbreaks by random vaccination.
The three idealistic vaccination strategies select their targets and
vaccinate them by rankings determined by the node metrics. The
left side of figure 11 captures the reduced epidemic sizes under an
individual targeting strategy which uses node betweenness to select
the individuals. For a realistic targeting of a distribution location,
the right side of figure 11 captures the potential reductions in the
epidemic sizes under the node-betweenness-based location target-
ing strategy. The location-based strategies are intuitively less
successful than the individual targeting methods, but they
represent much more feasible options for an administrative
intervention.
A brief comparison of the results shown in figures 9, 10, 11 can
be seen in figure 12. Figure 12 plots the average attack rates of the
three strategies and the case of no vaccination. It can be seen that
the situation of no vaccination results in the highest average attack
rates, while the individually targeting strategy results in the lowest
average attack rates and the remaining two strategies appear
similar in an intermediate level of effectiveness. The distributions
of the epidemic durations are not shown as they did not vary as R0
varies. We summarize the comparison of the different vaccination
strategies under the first type of experiments in table 1, which
describes the distributions of attack rates and epidemic durations
in days (in italics) by their averages, medians and 95% confidence
intervals. It is immediately interesting to notice that each of the
vaccination strategies reduces the average epidemic duration,
some by as much as 20 percent on the average value. In table 1, it
can be seen that the individual targeting methods have the highest
average results, but among the feasible methods, the location-
based targeting using the node betweenness metric is the most
successful at reducing the total cases on average. The node
betweenness also provides the best metric for the individual
targeting strategies.
The last column of table 2 displays the cases prevented per
vaccine distributed. The value cases prevented per vaccine has an
intuitive benchmark of the average vaccine efficacy at 0.72. If a
vaccination strategy is very efficient at stopping an outbreak, then
we can expect the average number of cases prevented per vaccine
to be higher than the typical efficacy of the vaccine. On the other
hand, if a vaccinated trial is resulting in an average number of
cases prevented per vaccine that is less than the typical vaccine
efficacy, it doesn’t necessitate that the vaccination strategy will
perform poorly in all situations. In general this situation implies
that the vaccines are being given to individuals who usually aren’t
being infected and therefore they made little use of the vaccine in
that set of trials. This could arise from either a poor vaccine
distribution strategy or from a distribution of vaccines that is larger
in size than a typical outbreak. When we have a strong outbreak,
the vaccines are almost surely going to be a necessary measure,
whereas in a weaker outbreak, most of the population will not be
infected and extra vaccines will be ‘‘unused’’ with respect to
preventing new cases. Notice that for the first type of experiment
when we are not considering any vaccination the epidemic impacts
roughly 5.1 percent of the population while the number of
vaccines distributed is sufficient for 10 percent of the population.
Table 2 lists the probabilities of outbreaks occurring under each
of the eight scenarios considered. Of particular interest is that the
targeted in-strength approach, having the lowest probability of an
Preventive Responses to Epidemics in Rural Regions
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 March 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 3 | e59028
Figure 9. Distributions of attack rates under no mitigation. The distributions of the total cases as a fraction of the considered population over
the estimated range of R0 are represented by the medians (dashed blue line), averages (blue line), and 95% confidence interval (grey shaded region).
As the infection rate increases, the epidemic size increases in a near-linear manner.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059028.g009
Figure 10. Distributions of attack rates under a random vaccination of 10 percent of the population. The distributions of the total cases
as a fraction of the considered population over the estimated range of R0 are represented by the medians (dashed blue line), averages (blue line), and
95% confidence interval (grey shaded region).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059028.g010
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outbreak, has a higher average attack rate and longer average
epidemic duration than the other targeted strategies.
Discussion
From the network analysis, we observed that the rural contact
structure displays a significant amount of heterogeneity in the
considered metrics. This heterogeneity suggests that the small
number of nodes having the highest values of each metric might
present strategic sub-populations for mitigation objectives. The
rural contact network also contained a relatively disease-resistant
sub-population due to their poor level of connectivity and location
on the ‘‘fringes’’ of the rural community network. From statistical
correlations, it appears that residents with higher levels of
education, who have longer commutes, who are younger, with
more income, those without diabetes or recent flu-like illnesses,
Figure 11. Distributions of attack rates under two mitigation strategies. (Left) Under a node-betweenness-based individual targeted
vaccination of 10 percent of the population, the distributions of the attack rate over the estimated range of R0 are represented by the medians
(dashed blue line), averages (blue line), and 95% confidence interval (grey shaded region). (Right) Under a node-betweenness-based location targeted
vaccination of 10% of the population, the distributions of the attack rate over the estimated range of R0 are plotted in the same manner.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059028.g011
Figure 12. Comparison of average attack rates for different mitigation strategies. The comparison of no mitigation (No Vacc, blue line), a
random vaccination of 10 percent of the population (Random, green line), node-betweenness-based individual targeted vaccination (T-Betw, red
line), and a node-betweenness-based location targeted vaccination (L-Betw, teal line) is represented by their respective average attack rates over the
estimated range of R0.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059028.g012
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who are away from home more hours each day, and who eat out
more often are more likely to be important players in the
according to the network metrics that influence the potential
spread of infectious diseases.
In the data collected from the rural survey, there remain
significant limitations. Although the survey presents a variety of
types of locations such as schools, restaurants, libraries, and public
attractions, the data does not sufficiently capture the information
regarding household interactions. It was not feasible to anony-
mously identify individual households and which survey respon-
dents visited them with the resources at our disposal. The lack of
information regarding young respondents and household interac-
tions remains a strong limitation in the characterization of this
community and the following epidemic study on the rural contact
network.
For vaccine distribution we considered seven strategies, but only
four are reasonably feasible for local administrators to implement,
those being the random distribution across the population and the
three location-based distributions. The traditional targeted groups
for distribution such as the health-care personnel, the very young
(6–59 months), the elderly (50 years or older), pregnant women,
those with chronic health issues, and American Indians are not
completely identifiable from our survey results [33]. We could
identify respondents by age range, but occupation and maternity
status are transitory positions and were not explored by the survey.
The global random distribution of vaccines gives a simplest
method to compare the other vaccination methods to. The
location-based methods are indicative for anonymously targeting
subpopulations, not only for vaccination campaigns, but also for
educational outreach to encourage social responses such as
adoption of preventative health practices.
Interestingly, using the network metrics to select locations does
not necessarily produce intuitive results. The restaurant chosen to
represent locations that are frequented by nodes with high node
outgoing node strength (as it had the highest average value) had
less than one-third of the survey respondents frequenting it than
some of the more popular restaurants in the region. Although
diseases are partially mitigated, there is a limit to the reduction
that can be observed in the total cases for the strongest diseases
due to the resource limitation. Therefore when considering
limited-resource vaccine distribution, local administrators should
probably follow the traditional priority schedule. However, the
identification of the critical locations would be useful for
preventative education efforts, real-time epidemic alerts, and
emergency resource distribution.
The results of this analysis are intended to help guide responses
to a rural epidemic threat. With this, responders can explore the
theoretical impacts that might be had from a limited-resource
vaccine distribution by exploring various locations for distribution.
Social behavior and human interaction (contact) are not exact
sciences, so the theoretical mitigation results should be considered
possibilities and aspirations rather than deterministic outcomes for
any rural county or town.
Conclusions
Starting with a survey of a rural community, demographics
were analyzed and an estimation of the social contact structure
was built. This network was measured and the metrics were
correlated with various demographics from the survey. Through
the use of an exact model of a stochastic SLIR Poisson process, we
Table 1. The attack rates of different strategies and the
duration of the epidemic outbreaks in days (in italics) shown
by the averages, medians, and confidence intervals of the
distributions.
Average Median 95% CI
No Vaccination 0.0512 0.0142 (0.0057, 0.3088)
10.7200 7.3066 (1.6101, 35.6527)
Random Vaccination 0.0407 0.0113 (0.0057, 0.2493)
9.9031 7.0369 (1.6190, 32.4859)
Targeted Betweenness 0.0251 0.0113 (0.0057, 0.1388)
8.3638 6.5215 (1.5960, 25.2766)
Targeted In-strength 0.0324 0.0113 (0.0057, 0.1955)
9.1509 6.7562 (1.6046, 29.4892)
Targeted Out-strength 0.0261 0.0113 (0.0057, 0.1445)
8.4930 6.5795 (1.6046, 25.8235)
Location Targeted Betweenness 0.0433 0.0113 (0.0057, 0.2635)
10.1597 7.1323 (1.6073, 33.5715)
Location Targeted In-strength 0.0433 0.0113 (0.0057, 0.2635)
10.1652 7.1454 (1.6231, 33.4379)
Location Targeted Out-strength 0.0434 0.0113 (0.0057, 0.2635)
10.1558 7.1178 (1.6153, 33.5992)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059028.t001
Table 2. The probabilities of an outbreak occurring under the eight different scenarios considered and the cases prevented per
vaccine distributed.
Probability of outbreak Cases Prevented Per Vaccine
No Vaccination 0.3928 —
Random Vaccination 0.3783 0.1065
Targeted Betweenness 0.3742 0.2638
Targeted In-strength 0.3623 0.1898
Targeted Out-strength 0.3768 0.2537
Location Targeted Betweenness 0.3778 0.0797
Location Targeted In-strength 0.3783 0.0795
Location Targeted Out-strength 0.3776 0.0790
An outbreak is defined as the occurrence of at least one secondary infection from the initial infected node.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0059028.t002
Preventive Responses to Epidemics in Rural Regions
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 10 March 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 3 | e59028
have characterized a typical influenza-like outbreak in the
community and investigated vaccination strategies. When consid-
ering resource-limited vaccine distribution strategies, we identified
critical locations for ethical targeting subpopulations with the goal
of effective disease prevention. Our aspiration is that this analysis
will be a valuable resource for both the rural community on which
this study focused, and also for several similar communities in the
region.
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